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ABSTRACT 
A novel communication system for use by a wide variety of first responders in disaster 
response is described. The system is based primarily on SMS messaging technologies and 
either indigenous mobile phone service providers or mobile phone service brought in via 
cellular-on-wheels (COWs), UAVs, rapidly deployed towers, etc. End users use either 
their own cell phones, running a native SMS application, or low-cost phones that are 
distributed by a large non-governmental organization, such as UN OCHA. If a 
proprietary network is set up, SIM cards are distributed to end users to allow access to the 
network, or administrators will explicitly allow access via a phone’s IMEI number or 
other access control methods. 
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 In the late afternoon on 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Port-
au-Prince, Haiti, instantly killing tens of thousands and entrapping hundreds of thousands 
under the remnants of poorly constructed dwellings, offices, shops, and other structures 
(The Economist 2010, 35–36). Public infrastructure and utilities, such as roads, 
electricity, water, and communications networks were severely degraded. Already home 
to a United Nations peacekeeping mission before the earthquake, Haiti’s extant capacity 
to care for its residents was minimal, let alone to respond to a natural disaster of such 
magnitude. With a population of 1.2 million, it was clear that Port-au-Prince needed help. 
The international community responded almost immediately with offers of 
financial and material assistance. Foreign governments and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) alike mobilized food distribution, medical care, Unified Search 
and Rescue (USAR) teams, and other vital services. As new information of the severity 
of the earthquake spread, the size of the response slowly built until a tidal wave of 
support flowed into Haiti. 
This surge of aid did not include large-scale assistance with communication 
technology, a vital and oft-forgotten service. Even some of the largest NGOs did not have 
a reliable method for team members to communicate with other organizations; most 
relied on temporally-asymmetric and Internet-access reliant e-mail to conduct business, 
which meant the lack of widespread Internet access significantly slowed relief operations. 
Without a unified communication platform the relief effort was severely hindered, 
slowing first responders’ ability to relay crucial information. 
The lack of communication technology also contributed to an overall lack of 
interorganizational cooperation. Collaboration has the potential to create new 
communities that in turn build personal relationships and increase morale among first 
responders (Meier and Munro 2010, 91–103). By coordinating and pooling relief efforts, 
all first responders combined create great synergies that can—and do—result in saved 
lives (Comfort and Kapucu 2006, 309–327). 
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 If a physical space were created where representatives of each organization could 
always be found, and a virtual commons were created where all other first responders 
could be contacted, the difficult communication situation, both physical and social, could 
be greatly improved. 
This novel conglomeration of first responders represents an enterprise of sorts, an 
ad-hoc group of responders working in the same virtual as well as physical space, with 
the similar macroscopic goals. 
Due to a lack of physical infrastructure and enterprise architecture to promote 
cross-organizational cooperation, a variety of communication gaps were apparent in post-
earthquake Port-au-Prince. Inspired by these observed shortfalls, this paper proposes a 
novel physical and social communication system based on tested and reliable 
standardized technologies. Utilizing cheap mobile phones, a Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) network, open source software, and a physical Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) space that all first responder organizations would be compelled 
to use, this paper does not propose inventing any new technologies. Instead, this study 
offers new ways to use the best of what already exists, and in so doing, improve cross 
organizational communication between implementing partners while minimizing the cost 
to create the system. 
What follows is a description of the disaster relief problem space as it exists 
today, the physical space in which relief workers operate, a description of the proposed 
communication system and associated enterprise architecture, and suggestions for ways 
that first responders could discover and use the system. This is not a detailed technical 
discussion, nor is it intended as a policy paper. The ultimate hope is that the suggestions 
in this study can be used as a nidus point from which to develop and grow an easy-to-use, 
universal communication system available to all disaster response organizations that they 
may use to interact more efficiently, and in so doing, help to alleviate human suffering. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many have attempted to design first responder communication systems for 
disaster areas. Aldunate, Ochoa, et. al designed a novel communication and routing 
system based on a novel short range wireless technology, and tested the system with 
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firefighters and civil engineers (Aldunate et al. 2006, 13–27). Mehendale, Paranjpe, et. al 
created an ad hoc routing protocol for WiFi networks that allows devices loaded with 
specialized software to participate in a network without centralized infrastructure or a 
“master” node (Mehendale, Paranjpe, and Vempala 2011, 446–447). Smart, Alistair-
Russell, et. al described a situational awareness system they dubbed AKTiveSA, which 
consists of several visualization software packages, communication aggregators, and 
information filters designed to help first responders—primarily military first 
responders—gain a better understanding of the disaster area (Smart et al. 2007, 703–716). 
Gaber proposed a system that would utilize smartphones and high bandwidth connections 
to show first responders a customized screen that showed only the information that is 
relevant to that particular responder (“Disasters Unfold” n.d.). 
Similarly, many have written about characteristics of successful disaster response 
information systems. Bui, Sankaran, et. al designed a framework for “global information 
networks” for use in disaster areas, and outlined some recommendations for the social 
interactions required by collaborative environments where participants are mixed from 
groups with different goals and priorities (Bui et al. 2000, 427–442). Daly suggested that 
an unclassified, open-to-all network is vitally important to decreasing cross-
organizational friction and increasing efficiency and effectiveness of HA/DR operations 
(Daly 2007). Gomez and Turoff proved that SMS (Short Message Service) text is an 
effective technology to use in disaster relief operations, and that since many users are 
already familiar with using SMS in their everyday lives, it can be expected that virtually 
any first responder in any part of the world would be able to operate an SMS-centric 
system (Gomez and Turoff 2007, 45–50). Meier and Munro documented the successes of 
a crowdsourced SMS system used by victims in Haiti to report both emergencies and 
non-emergencies to first responders (Meier and Munro 2010, 91–103). Summer used the 
earthquake in Haiti as a case study and outlined the lack of communication technology 
available in disaster areas, and described how NGOs very rarely bring their own ICT 
(Summer 2010, 55–68). In their detailed essay Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of 
Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies, The United Nations Foundation et. al 
showed how communication and information sharing technologies are vital to the 
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successful conduct of a disaster relief mission, and how the emergence of mobile 
technologies paired with crowdsourcing has become an extremely powerful combination 
(United Nations Foundation et al. 2011). 
All of these previous works share two common threads. First, they all 
acknowledge the value of communication technologies in disaster response and advocate 
more widespread cooperation between different organizations in order to realize greater 
efficiencies and effectiveness. Second, all of the works that propose systems either stop 
short of proposing a tangible solution and an organizational construct under which to 
operate the system. Some papers put forward overwrought and proprietary network 
technologies that would be difficult to implement in the best of environmental conditions, 
and virtually impossible to implement in the austere environments found in disaster areas. 
The system proposed in this thesis will utilize SMS, one of the most widely used, 
cheapest, familiar, resilient, and lowest bandwidth technologies available. All of the 
hardware and software required for the system already exists as commercial off-the-shelf 
technology. In addition, the social framework under which the system would be used is 
easy to understand, and is consistent with current disaster area practice. These factors all 
combine to form a novel approach to disaster communications, both social and physical. 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 7
II. PROBLEM SPACE 
The austere conditions found in disaster areas present a unique challenge to first 
responders and victims who attempt to communicate, operate, and survive within that 
space. Vital utilities and infrastructure are often either severely degraded or completely 
destroyed. Electrical power is often non-existent, telephone lines do not work, cell 
phones are inoperable, and wireless backhaul connections to distant areas are often 
knocked offline. Depending on the type of disaster, physical structures such as apartment 
buildings, businesses, hospitals, and homes may be unsafe for human habitation. 
Earthquake can cause structural instability; storm surges from tsunami or hurricanes can 
create unsanitary conditions as waste products from sewage treatment plants, landfills, 
chemical plants, etc., is blasted through city streets and into buildings. Surges of water 
also mean that any electrical equipment that is low enough to the ground—within the first 
floor of a building, for example—will likely be filled with brackish water, rendering the 
equipment inoperable immediately following the disaster, and in most cases will need to 
be completely replaced in order to restore communication networks. 
 Even the systems that should be the most reliable are often knocked offline, such 
as the voice radio networks used by police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS). 
Those systems are reliant upon terrestrial radio repeaters that are vulnerable to sundry 
disasters, and when they are online, the radio systems of different agencies are often not 
interoperable, meaning cross-organizational communication is difficult. Communication 
across groups can often only be accomplished over more device and network agnostic 
methods, such as telephone or e-mail, or by simply swapping radios between different 
groups. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, first responders in the Bay St. Louis and 
Waveland, Mississippi area were unable to communicate with each other for several 
days—and in some cases weeks—following the storm. Communication between first 
responders was first re-established not via traditional radio networks, but instead by 
deploying Internet Protocol-based technologies such as satellite uplinks, WiMAX point-
to-point radio links, Wi-Fi clouds, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephones 
(Steckler 2009). 
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 Disasters that occur in locations that lack existing robust communication 
networks, such as many third world countries, present a unique challenge to international 
and local first responders. Following the earthquake in Port-au-Prince, first responders 
were confronted with a country that had an inadequate indigenous response capability: 
There existed little communications infrastructure, no earthquake disaster preparedness 
measures, and a corrupt and mostly ineffective government that had few trained 
personnel capable of responding to the catastrophe. Adding to this challenging 
environment, the disaster resulted in massive causalities—approximately 222,570 by 
United Nations estimates—and the crippling or total ruination of seventy percent of 
structures within Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas (United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Response to the disaster was further hampered by 
the destruction of the City’s seaport and the international airport’s air traffic control 
tower. For the hours and days immediately following the event the only way to move 
goods and materials into Port-au-Prince was via air transports using visual flight rules, or 
trucks dispatched from the Dominican Republic—a 4.5-hour trip with no traffic. 
Predictably, the disaster caused a traffic jam on roads leading to and from the Dominican 
Republic; drive times of 14 hours or more were reported to the author by first responders 
who had traveled from Santo Domingo to Port-au-Prince. 
 NGOs, foreign governments, and other organizations mounted a large and rapid 
response to the crisis, sending huge amounts of relief supplies, first responders, and 
logistical support. Billions of dollars were pledged from nations, groups of nations, 
NGOs, individuals, and other organizations. Countless tons of relief supplies were flown, 
trucked, and shipped into Port-au-Prince. United States President Barack Obama declared 
that the people of Haiti “will not be forsaken; you will not be forgotten,” and set into 
motion one of the largest disaster response operations in United States history (Obama 
2010). 
 The United Nations established a large logistics base (“UN log base”) at the Port-
au-Prince airport, which became a central meeting place and communication forum for 
first responders of all stripes. Organizations as varied as World Vision, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the government of Morocco, United States military 
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officers, and representatives from the government of Haiti, and UN peacekeepers from a 
variety of countries all worked within the same conglomeration of tents, mobile trailers, 
sun shelters, and open air courtyards. Attempts were made to coordinate between 
organizations with varied levels of success. The UN cluster system meetings, where 
organizations with similar relief goals met together in an attempt to synchronize efforts, 
became the hub of cross-organizational coordination and collaboration. Organized by 
interest area, such as Health, Food, Communications, the cluster meetings presented an 
environment where issues could be discussed, and solutions proposed. 
The meetings also represented the best opportunity for first responders to get in 
contact with each other, as it could be assumed that certain organizations would likely 
attend certain meetings. This method often proved imperfect since not all organizations 
were always present at each meeting. Daily participation by each organization is difficult 
due to travel distances, transportation logistics, staffing shortages, and a dearth of 
available time. If a responder was searching for a specific organization not represented at 
the cluster meeting, and the next meeting was too far in the future, the next best method 
for getting into contact was to conduct a manual search by walking around the UN log 
base. The author observed first responders who spent hours walking around inquiring 
about the whereabouts of a specific person or an organization. That time lost represents a 
large amount of valuable man hours that could be better spent working any number of 
other response-related tasks. This task was made still more challenging by the occasional 
individual who did not seem “forward leaning,” and was uninterested in helping. 
 Within the Haitian earthquake response there existed a wide variation in the 
willingness of each organization to work with other organizations. The author observed 
productive collaborations between several organizations, such as communications-
focused NGOs providing assistance to those without communications capabilities, and a 
technical exchange between the World Food Program and Télécoms Sans Frontières; the 
author also observed organizations that refused to collaborate with certain other 
organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières’ refusal to work with the militaries of 
any country. Unfortunately, these observations are consistent with the observations of 
many others during this and prior disasters. Lack of coordination is the norm, rather than 
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the exception (The Economist 2010, 35–36; Comfort and Kapucu 2006, 309–327; Garnett 
and Moore 2010, 28–29; Keen et al. 2010, 2–12; Lindsay 2010, 18–22; Piotrowski 2010, 
107–112; Parker 2003; McEntire 1999, 351–361). 
 Although face-to-face meetings were often the preferred method of 
communication, one of the more reliable means of getting in touch within the UN log 
base, and to workers outside the log base walls, was e-mail. The World Food Program, a 
UN-run NGO that focuses primarily on food distribution, set up an open Wi-Fi network 
near the center of the UN log base. This resulted in a kind of outdoor “Internet café” 
where first responders gathered. This congregation represented not only an opportunity to 
communicate electronically with others, it also created an opportunity for first responders 
to “bump into” each other and socialize their needs, ideas, and observations. Like the 
proverbial watering hole as a meeting place for animals on the savannah, the availability 
of a Wi-Fi cloud created a valuable opportunity to assemble, communicate, collaborate, 
and improve the exchange of needs assessment data that is critical to efficient disaster 
response. 
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III. VIRTUAL SPACE 
The aforementioned methods of communication and information portals 
combined form the status quo for a disaster relief virtual space. This virtual space is 
occupied by first responders, volunteer and paid programmers, victims, the families and 
friends of victims, government agencies, and non-governmental agencies. Their 
interactions are enabled by the global Internet and the spaces provided by websites, 
information portals, visualization tools (such as mapping and GIS), blogs, social 
networks, and sites that enable messaging over web and SMS such as Twitter and 
GroupMe. Within the virtual commons, the people involved with and affected by a 
disaster interact, gather and process information, and ultimately attempt to improve the 
situation. As opposed to a virtual space-less environment, such as that which existed 
before the advent of widespread information technologies, virtual communication and 
collaboration results in greater exchange of information at a more rapid pace (Allen 1977; 
Summer 2010, 55–68). 
Large-scale data exchange with responders on the ground and others around the 
world was achieved primarily through a tangle of “disaster relief portals,” each with its 
own database, user interface, and user accounts. The end user requirements for entry to 
each site varied depending upon the organization. For example, the UN Virtual OSOCC 
(On-Site Operations Coordination Center) required users to register and be approved by a 
site administrator before access is granted; the US Department of Defense–run All 
Partners Access Network (APAN) required a similar approval process after filling out an 
arduous account application. Over the course of a multipage web-based application 
process, each user was required to provide extensive contact information, proof of where 
the user worked, and an extremely long and complex password. There were few cases of 
data exchange between disaster relief portals, a fact which created several “stove pipes” 
where data was housed and not shared horizontally. 
Any increase in communication and collaboration is desirable; as noted in the 
prior chapter, the current state of disaster response lacks the coordination that could result 
in more effective operations. The system proposed creates a novel virtual space, utilizing 
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extant software and online communities to create a “mashup” of effective systems that 
result in a more efficient disaster response enterprise. The system also leverages very low 
bandwidth, widely available, and familiar technologies that use standard mobile phone 
networks to provide access to the virtual space from any nearby location. By combining 
the virtual space, a path to access the virtual space, and a physical space that allows for 
face-to-face collaboration (discussed further in the next chapter), the proposed solution 
creates a system that increases communication via three of the most vital areas: the 
physical, virtual, and social worlds. 
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IV. PHYSICAL SPACE 
 In disaster response first responders often operate primarily within their own 
operating space; that is to say, the majority of their energy is focused inward and toward 
their organization’s primary goals, which are often dictated by donors. First responders 
disperse across a relatively large geographical area, seeking out those in need to dispense 
aid. This geographical dispersion and inward organizational focus results in a situation 
where, in a connectivity-starved environment, detachments of first responders are 
effectively isolated from all others after they leave a base of operations. This was often 
true in Haiti, despite the fact that the indigenous cellular network remained relatively 
stable and usable throughout the disaster response. First responders either did not have 
the financial resources to purchase local mobile phones and service from local network 
providers, did not wish to rely on local providers, had difficulty coordinating the logistics 
to procure mobile phones and distribute them, or did not know that the network was 
usable. Given this total disconnection, it was often the case that aid workers and first 
responders would depart their logistical base of operations in the morning and not be in 
contact again until they returned in the evening. 
 NGOs positioned at static locations, such as hospitals, fared little better. The 
author visited several medical facilities and found identical conditions at each. L’Hôpital 
de la Communauté Haïtienne, or Haitian Community Hospital (HCH), located in the 
Petionville district of Port-au-Prince, had a residential-grade satellite Internet connection 
that worked intermittently, allowing small bursts of data, such as a few e-mails, to be sent 
during short windows of connectivity. This allowed the hospital to send requests to the 
outside world, however since most in-country first responders did not have consistent 
access to e-mail—and few knew how to get into contact with first responders from 
specific organizations anyway—even the connectivity they did enjoy had limited utility. 
 Unreliable or a complete lack of communication was the case not only with 
NGOs, but also with organizations that are typically considered to be much more capable 
in deployed scenarios, such as the United States military. On 22 January 2010, the author 
was deployed from the USNS Comfort to field hospital Terminal Varreux to help 
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facilitate communication between field hospital personnel and the Comfort. The facility 
was manned by approximately 30 medical professionals—doctors, nurses, respiratory 
specialists—deployed by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, as 
well as medical officers from the United States Navy. Upon arrival it was clear that 
although the facility had its own VHF radio capability and a person dedicated to 
communications, their radios were not compatible with the radios used by the Comfort, 
and communication with the ship was accomplished via an intermediary stationed 
elsewhere in Port-au-Prince. In practice, this method of communication was unreliable. 
Variable contact with the ship meant medevacs of victims, resupply requests, and other 
vital messages were not received by the ship. Terminal Varreux, geographically isolated 
and staffed by United States Government and military personnel, was little better off than 
the NGOs who deployed without any communication capability. 
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V. THE SYSTEM 
Given that organizations have their own specialties and strengths, and 
collaboration between groups would result in more positive outcomes in disaster relief, it 
is clear that it would be beneficial to facilitate intergroup communication and 
cooperation, in both the physical and virtual worlds. By providing a space where each 
organization could always be found, in both the physical and virtual worlds, the difficult 
communication situation could be greatly improved. This physical space could be a large 
tent, set up by a neutral party such as the United Nations, with tables set up for 
representatives from each organization—NGOs, militaries, government agencies—all 
included and encouraged to participate. The space would provide wired open Internet 
access—not a proprietary network such as the United States Department of Defense 
SIPRNet, NIPRNet, or any similarly restricted network—as well as Wi-Fi network 
connections. Internet access could be provided by the World Food Program, the United 
States Department of Defense Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE), or 
whoever is capable of providing such connectivity. Similar to the Internet Café set up by 
the World Food Program at the UN log base in Port-au-Prince, it is certain that in a 
connectivity-starved environment that people will gravitate toward the places where 
connectivity is available, such as the proposed tent. This lure then facilitates contact 
between organizations that would not have otherwise communicated with each other. 
 This proposed combination of a physical and virtual space also creates a dynamic 
where first responders may leave the physical space of the tent, but they are still members 
of the virtual space and the community inherent therein. These two spaces amount to a 
new first responder ecosystem where it is possible to work more closely together, even if 
physical proximity is not maintained. 
A. STRUCTURE OF THE SYSTEM 
 The proposed system is comprised of four primary components: The mobile 
phone network, mobile phones, the software infrastructure required to support the system, 
and EOC tent. (See Figure 2.) The cell phones—basic units with GPS, long-lasting 
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batteries, and only texting capability—are backed by either the indigenous mobile phone 
network or a network provided by a rapidly deployable means, such as a Cellular-On-
Wheels System (COWS) or an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) with the appropriate 
antennae and optional backhaul connection to a larger mobile network. Once turned on, 
the phones themselves ask the user to select which organization they are from, e.g., 
“World Food Program,” “Save the Children,” “UN-OCHA,” “US Military,” etc., and for 




















Figure 2.   System Components and Path of Messages. 
When a text message is sent from the phone, the message is geocoded to the users 
location and sent to the central EOC tent. The message is then routed to a laptop inside 
the tent, where a representative from that user’s organization stands watch around the 
clock for the duration of the disaster. The message is displayed on a map along with the 
user’s name and the time the message was sent. The representative then has the option to 
respond directly to that user via text, forward the message to someone else in the 
network, or act upon the content of the message. For example, if the message said, “Food 
distribution becoming violent, need force protection,” the representative then has an easy 
way to address the issue: Forward the geocoded message to a military representative who 
is also physically sitting nearby in the same tent. If desired, the representative could walk 
over to the military representative to follow up on the contents of the message. This 
creates a two novel spaces—one virtual and one physical—which enable first responders 
to rapidly communicate within their organization and with any other participating 
organization, either via the physical or the virtual spaces. 
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B. MOBILE NETWORK  
 Significant infrastructure is usually required for any wireless network that 
blankets an area with widely available coverage. For this reason, and given the 
indiscriminate destruction that accompany disasters, it would seem inadvisable to attempt 
any sort of network based on the widespread availability of a wireless network. However, 
over the last decade it has been shown that modern mobile phone networks are 
remarkably robust and capable of withstanding significant damage. The indigenous 
mobile phone network in Port-au-Prince was never fully inoperable, and victims were 
able to send text messages within hours of the 7.0 earthquake (Meier and Munro 2010, 
91–103). All of the mobile phone network providers in Christchurch, New Zealand 
reported that their networks remained partially or fully operational following the  
6.3 magnitude earthquake on 22 February 2011 (Anonymous 2011). Thus, if available, 
the system could use indigenous mobile phone networks as a backhaul to the EOC tent. 
 If the indigenous network is no longer operable, there are a number of options 
available to create a hastily formed mobile phone network, including Cellular On Wheels 
Systems (COWS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-mounted (UAV) systems, as well as the 
option to leverage existing cell sites for new and repaired equipment. (See Figure 3.)  
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Figure 3.   Mobile Phone Network Options. 
 COWS provide mobile phone antennae, generator power, and backhaul 
connections on a rapidly deployable platform, such as a trailer or a self-propelled truck. 
Those systems can provide service equivalent to standard static cellular tower sites, 
enabling hundreds or thousands of users over several square miles to connect to the 
mobile phone network (Tipper, n.d.). Such units could be flown into the area of operation 
and deployed throughout the affected area, using any surviving terrestrial wiring for 
backhaul, or satellite connections back to the greater telephone network (and therefore 
the Internet at large). 
 UAVs have the capacity to carry a variety of payloads and to loiter over any area 
for an extended period of time, and those capabilities combined can be leveraged to 
transform a UAV into a kind of cell tower in the sky, where the UAV is equipped with 
cellular electronics and antennae on its underbelly and wings, as well as different 
antennae to create a wireless backhaul connection either to a terrestrial base station or a 
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satellite. UAV-based cellular networks have two primary advantages: (1) as opposed to 
setting up a terrestrial network of cellular phone towers, UAVs can be deployed relatively 
rapidly, and (2) the coverage area afforded by an airborne platform is far greater than that 
of terrestrial antennae. Assuming a system with a five watt amplifier and standard CDMA 
equipment, a UAV flown at 5,000 feet could cover an approximately 20-mile area in 
diameter (Varga 2009). A number of smaller UAVs could be networked together in a 
mesh, along with a mesh node on the ground, providing a self-contained mobile network 
that would not require a backhaul connection to the telephone network at large. 
 There is also the possibility for the indigenous terrestrial infrastructure to be 
repaired. Another option is to leverage the physical infrastructure, such as cellular towers, 
power wiring, etc., to either build or rebuild the terrestrial network. This solution may be 
preferable in situations where damage is limited and there are sufficient personnel with 
the requisite knowledge to build the infrastructure, since building more permanent 
locations means implementing a solution that will remain after the disaster response 
phase is complete. The Swedish company Ericsson has a unit of their company 
specifically dedicated to working in austere conditions and disaster response scenarios 
(Ericsson). Their expertise, and other companies like theirs, can be used to rebuild critical 
infrastructure and get an operable network back into operation. 
 It is also possible to develop and deploy a ground-based GSM system with 
minimal infrastructure by utilizing standard antennae, amplifiers and base station units, 
basic computers (laptops, desktops, or servers), and open source software. OpenBTS is a 
software product maintained by the open source software community that is capable of 
advanced management of a GSM mobile phone network. The software, along with easily 
obtained commercial off-the-self parts, has been deployed in challenging terrain and 
austere environments, most notably serving thousands of handsets in extremely harsh 
desert conditions at the annual Burning Man festival in the Black Rock Desert in Nevada. 
The OpenBTS system also powers the GSM network for the island of Niue in the Pacific, 
serving a population of 30,000. 
 In order to avoid network congestion, the mobile network should have the 
capability to “whitelist” certain phones so that only first responders can connect and send 
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and receive messages. System operators should determine an easy-to-remember SMS 
shortcode to which all messages will be sent. It is important to select a shortcode that is 
also available on indigenous networks, so that if the user wishes to connect to the 
indigenous network instead of the first responder-only network, his or her messages to 
and from the proposed system will still be routed correctly. 
A. MOBILE PHONES 
 End users of the rapidly deployed mobile network, or the rebuilt terrestrial 
network, require mobile phones to access the services of the proposed system. There are 
two possibilities for getting mobile phones into the hands of first responders: Either they 
bring their own mobile phones, or mobile phones are provided to them. Since the system 
is entirely based upon SMS, GPS, and a standard mobile phone network technology, such 
as GSM, only a very simple phone would be required. A unit with a QWERTY keyboard, 
low power consumption, a large battery, and GPS capabilities would be ideal. There are 
numerous existing phones available on the consumer market that meet those 
qualifications. It is also likely that an organization that already produces mobile phones 
and has a pre-existing interest in disaster response, such as Ericsson, would have an 
interest in providing a solution to the phone problem. If an industry partner cannot be 
found then the phones could be sourced and purchased in bulk by one of the larger NGOs 
that has an interest in disaster communications, such as the World Food Program. 
 It is also likely that some first responders will bring their own mobile phones and 
will wish to use them to participate in the proposed system. Provided the underlying 
wireless technology used in their mobile phone is compatible with the network in use in 
the disaster area, this can be accommodated by gathering their phone’s identifying 
information, such as International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI), Subscriber 
Identity Module (SIM) card information, etc., and whitelisting their phone on the 
network. The user’s identifying information, such as first and last name and organization, 
should be associated with the user’s phone information, so that when messages are 




perspective, he need only text his messages to the appropriate shortcode using their 
mobile phone’s built-in SMS application, and their organization’s representative in the 
tent will be able to reply. 
 If geocoding is desired, and a terrestrial network is used, the proposed system 
could locate the user with low precision by detecting which mobile network tower he or 
she is associated. This approach would not be practical if the proposed system utilized a 
UAV for network service, since the coverage area provided by the UAV would be too 
large to make location information useful and easily calculated. In that case, the user has 
two options: Manually input his latitude and longitude coordinates into the text message, 
or state where he is relative to landmarks, and the organization’s representative could 
then manually geolocate the user. 
 It is also possible that a separate application could be programmed to run on first 
responder’s phones that would automatically add geolocation information to each text 
message. This approach is likely not feasible since it requires software developers to (1) 
build and maintain specialized software, and (2) build versions for each of the phone 
platforms that first responders may wish to use. Loading the software to the phones 
would also present a problem, as most mobile phone operating systems rely on “app 
stores” that require connections to the Internet and all applications to be preapproved for 
inclusion by the company in charge of the store. 
 The geolocation issue, along with the desire to have low-power phones that have 
high-capacity batteries, mean that distributing low-cost mobile phones is likely the best 
solution for the proposed system. The distribution of phones also means that first 
responders would not need to concern themselves with bringing their own phones and 
cope with a wide variety of chargers and power requirements. 
B. SOFTWARE INFRASTRUCTURE 
 All of the components of the proposed system are intended to be chosen from 
commercial off-the shelf (COTS) products, including the software infrastructure. The 
system will require three primary components: Operating systems, SMS gateway 





Figure 4.   Software Infrastructure Components. 
Servers, located in the EOC tent to lessen the bandwidth requirements on any 
backhaul links to the Internet, should run commercially-available and widely supported 
operating systems such as Microsoft Windows or Linux. This not only ensures low cost, 
but also the possibility that someone will know how to repair the operating system or 
applications if there are any failures while the system is deployed in the field. The SMS 
gateway software installed on the servers should be capable of sending and receiving 
thousands of messages per day with very high reliability (beyond “five nines” of 
reliability). Compatibility and performance with carrier text messaging systems should 
also be taken into consideration since it is probable the proposed system will need to 
interoperate with indigenous text messaging systems. 
The user-facing software shall consist of text messaging software, mapping and 
visualization tools, and standard web tools. The user laptops shall run Microsoft 
Windows, Mac OS X, or an easy-to-use version of Linux with an interface that will be 
familiar enough to most users so that they will be able to operate the laptop with minimal 
difficulty. The mapping and visualization tools shall allow the user to read incoming 
messages, see those messages plotted on a map, and easily respond to the message, or 
forward the message to another user or organizational representative. Such software 
already exists. For example, Ushahidi is an open source crowdsourcing and mapping 
application specifically designed to visualize SMS information taken from large groups 
of users. Other products could be used; the most important factors in choosing the 
visualization software are: Reliability, ease of use for users who are unfamiliar with the 
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software, and ability to incorporate new map data from a variety of sources on the fly 
(i.e., terrain data, imagery from military UAVs, user-input notes from OpenStreet Map). 
Both the server and the user software shall be maintained as disk images that can 
be rapidly replicated onto a wide variety of consumer hardware. System performance 
requirements should be kept at a minimum so as to ensure all computers that are brought 
to the disaster will be capable of effectively running all software packages. Server and 
user software shall also be available as individual package files on a single disc or in a 
repository location on the Internet. 
The server and user software packages will need to be created and maintained by 
an organization or a group of users. An NGO with an interest in IT could be asked to 
maintain software images. The task could also be given to a group in the tech community. 
Many successful humanitarian software projects exist as completely volunteer-staffed 
efforts, and there is no reason why these software packages could not be supported by a 
group of self-organized and dedicated tech-savvy programmers. 
C. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER TENT 
 All of the text messages sent by first responders in the field will be sent to an 
EOC tent or other structure located at a central meeting place, optimally where the most 
first responders have decided to congregate. The structure itself could be provided by a 
military organization, an NGO, or the UN. The lighted tent will have tables set up with 
laptops, power outlets, WiFi, and wired networking. Each of the laptops and associated 
desk positions will be available for any organization that wishes to post a representative 
inside the tent twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Part of the strength of the 
system is this guarantee that representatives from each organization are physically 
present inside the tent, thus there should be incentives or disincentives designed to keep 
the tent staffed at all times. For example, the system could be designed such that if the 
representative leaves the tent for an extended period, perhaps more than half an hour, that 
representative’s access to the system will be temporarily suspended, and the first 
responder’s from that organization will receive a message that states their representative 
has left his or her post. The representative will then need to go to the agency in charge of 
the tent and the network to explain their absence. It will then be up to the agency to 
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decide whether to reinstate that organization’s access to the network. If access is granted 
once again, first responders in the field will receive a message that says access has been 
restored. Such heavy-handed policies may be required to encourage first responders and 
their organizations to keep a representative present in the tent at all times—presence that 
is vital to effective cooperation and collaboration. (See Figure 5.) 
 
 
Figure 5.   Example Emergency Operations Center Layout. 
If implemented well, the EOC tent could become an excellent supplement, or 
even replacement, for the cluster meeting system. Since information would be flowing 
between organizations at all times, it would become less important to hold daily 
meetings. 
The value of the face-to-face interaction afforded by the EOC tent should not be 
understated. Trust between individuals and between groups is earned over time, and that 
trust can be built much more quickly when those individuals are interacting face-to-face. 
 The availability of a free and open WiFi network with access to the Internet will 
also be a significant draw for first responders, similar to what was observed with the 
WFP’s Internet café at the UN log base in Port-au-Prince. 
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VI. ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 
The disaster response business enterprise in Haiti existed as a multi-headed 
organization led partially by the United States and partially by the United Nations. NGOs 
looked to both organizations for help in areas such as transportation, force protection, and 
supplies, although some NGOs attempted to operate independently. There were 
seemingly no rules governing who was in charge and who could enable or prevent others 
from pursuing a given goal. In this way, there was no official hierarchy directing the 
activities of each—aside from the generally accepted standards of human conduct—
however many organizations relied upon one another for logistics support, supplies, etc. 
In this enterprise, materials, logistical systems, and even aid workers were often shared 
on an ad-hoc basis, but there was no formal system in place to coordinate those efforts. 
Connections were made in a serendipitous manner, and tasks were identified and pursued 
based on those connections. For example, after observing a medical cluster group 
meeting at the UN Log Base, the author made contact with a pediatrician who ran an 
NGO dedicated to serving children in need of medical care. The physician noted the lack 
of a system that would allow first responders to know where hospitals and medical 
facilities were located, which facilities had which capabilities and had available beds. The 
author identified the needed features within Sahana, an open source web-based disaster 
response management software tool, and sent suggestions for changes to the 
programmers of Sahana based on feedback from the physician. The existence of that 
feature of Sahana was then socialized at the next medical cluster group meeting. By 
meeting one another face-to-face, identifying a problem, and pursuing known resources, a 
solution to a problem was found and implemented. Each participant in this ad-hoc 
association provided their own expertise, and a positive outcome resulted. This is 
illustrative of what can happen when disparate groups work together as an enterprise 



















Figure 6.   System Enterprise Architecture. 
One of the keys to this interaction was the physical proximity of the willing 
actors. The creation of the EOC tent, the availability of free and open Internet access, the 
supply of free and operable mobile phones (and the accompanying requirement that every 
participating organization be present in the tent), are all intended to encourage ad-hoc 
interactions on a massive scale. Prior studies have noted in volumes that physical 
proximity increases productivity, efficiency, and interaction between disparate groups. 
Teasley et al. found that software development groups who worked together in the same 
room doubled productivity, and working more than thirty meters apart had the same 
effect on productivity as working remotely (Teasley et al. 2000). United States Army 
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Lieutenant General Keen, commander of Joint Task Force-Haiti, noted that being in the 
same room with first responders from Brazil, the United Nations, and other nations in the 
hours and days following the earthquake in Haiti was instrumental in rapidly formulating 
a disaster response plan (Keen et al. 2010, 2–12). It has also been shown that 
organizations that use electronic forms of messaging are far more productive at the same 
tasks as those organizations that do not use any sort of electronic messaging (Finholt, 
Sproull, and Kiesler 1990, 291–325). All of these studies were conducted in 
environments where stable communication networks were available. It is almost a 
certainty that similar results, if not better results, would be obtained if comparable studies 
were conducted within the communication-starved environment of a disaster area. 
Likewise, it seems a certainty that if organizations were physically located proximally to 
each other, and even those who were not always proximate knew where they could find 
representatives of another organization if they needed to, great gains in productivity 
would result. The hours it takes for one person to look for another specific person, or 
simply any representative of another organization, would be saved. Such improvement in 
lead time directly affects the total time required to deliver relief. 
However, the ability and desire of each organization to work together with 
another varied widely. Cultural boundaries, differences in opinion, and other factors often 
result in strained relationships or even complete non-communication between groups. 
This inability or even stark refusal to work across organizations is highly unfortunate 
given that each organization has its strengths and its weaknesses, and combining efforts 
has the potential to result in a whole greater than the sum of its parts (Comfort and 
Kapucu 2006, 309–327). 
The enterprise architecture as it existed in Haiti need not change much to support 
this proposed system. As mentioned before, an organization, likely the UN, would need 
to be responsible for setting up the EOC tent and enforcing the few basic rules, and 
another organization, also likely the UN, would need to be responsible for providing the 
mobile network (if the indigenous network is not functional), the mobile phones, and a 
backhaul Internet connection. Due to proximity, ad-hoc groups would form within the 
EOC tent, and those ad-hoc groups would achieve tasks that likely would have been 
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much more difficult to coordinate, or simply impossible to coordinate, without the 
physical and virtual spaces created by the proposed system. Instituting more business 
architecture beyond that, such as requiring NGOs to report to the UN for permission for 
individual tasks, would cause backlash among independent-minded NGOs and would 
likely be counter-productive. 
Indeed, the hope is that by creating an enterprise where all first responders 
interact and work on the same problem within the same virtual and physical space, that a 
kind of heedful enterprise would be created, one where each participant is more aware of 
what the other participants in the group are doing, and can therefore anticipate the needs 
of others in order to get more done. Such dynamics have been noted in several 
operational circumstances, and there does not exist any reason why that a similar level of 
understanding could not be attained through the proposed system (Weick and Roberts 
1993, 357–381). 
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VII. DISCOVERY AND ALLOCATION OF SYSTEM 
 The proposed combination of mobile phones, mobile network, disaster 
management software, and EOC space, along with first responders from a wide variety of 
organizations, create a powerful combination of virtual and physical spaces where all 
components operating in concert create a whole greater than the sum of its parts. 
However, if first responders and organizations are unaware of or otherwise unable to find 
the system—or the system is simply unavailable—the value decreases as each person or 
organization does not participate. Thus it is important to identify methods by which first 
responders will discover the existence of the proposed system, both before a disaster 
occurs and during the response to an event. There are a variety of methods that could be 
employed to encourage discovery of the platform, including pre-disaster socialization of 
the system, prominent positioning of the system at key organizational points of a disaster 
area, and “viral” methods of discovery. 
There is a vibrant and active community of volunteer technology experts who run 
various mailing lists, blogs, information portals, and other resources tailored toward the 
ultimate goal of alleviating the suffering of disaster victims. The existence and utility of 
the proposed system could be socialized within those groups, with volunteers encouraged 
to write about the system on various media, and to pass on the word about the system to 
first responders they know. Potential participating organizations could be asked to make a 
non-binding commitment to use the system at the next disaster where it has been 
successfully deployed. Provided they are cheap enough, phones could potentially be sent 
to organizations before a disaster occurs. (This approach carries with it a risk that 
organizations that do not have significant lift capacity could leave the phones behind in 
favor of other materials they deem to be more important.) The system could be presented 
to the leadership of various organizations before a disaster, and those leaders could make 
it the policy of their organization to use the system in the event of deployment to a 
disaster. 
The existence of the system should be promoted at areas where first responders 
gather within the disaster area itself. Whenever the United Nations deploys to a disaster 
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they set up an On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) tent where first 
responders “check-in” to a disaster and announce their presence and the capabilities they 
have brought.  The OSOCC has three stated objectives: 
 
1. To be a link between international responders and the Government of the 
affected country. 
2. To provide a system for coordinating and facilitating the activities of 
international relief efforts at a disaster site, notably following an 
earthquake, where the coordination of many international USAR teams is 
critical to ensure optimal rescue efforts. 
3. To provide a platform for cooperation, coordination and information 
management among international humanitarian agencies (UN OCHA). 
 
Promotion of the proposed system is clearly consistent with objectives two and three. As 
first responders check in, UN staff should suggest the system as a method to keep group 
members in constant communication with each other, as well as the first responder 
community at large. 
 UN cluster meetings also present a unique opportunity to socialize the existence 
of the system. At the beginning of each meeting an announcement could be made that 
states that the system is available to all first responders for no charge, and that the system 
represents a unique opportunity. 
 Perhaps the most compelling method for discovery of the system is user-to-user 
socialization. First responders who are in the field using the system will inevitably come 
into contact with other first responders who are not participants in the system, and when 
the non-participants see others text messaging successfully, or participating first 
responders suggest that they connect via the system, they will likely ask which network 
the user is using, where they procured the phone, etc. Provided that non-participant sees 
value in the system as described, they will likely attempt to participate thereafter. This 
method of discovery represents a type of viral discovery, where the user base could 
potentially grow exponentially as more and more users discover the system. 
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 The system should be allocated with a series of rules and priorities. To prevent 
network congestion and overcrowding the network, only first responders should be 
allowed to access the network. In addition, larger and established organizations such as 
the World Food Program, Save the Children, World Vision, local government, etc., 
should be given access priority so as to ensure that the larger players within the disaster 
area participate in the physical and the virtual network. Consideration should be given to 
the idea that some organizations have reserved positions within the tent so as to optimize 
the physical space within the tent. 
 While open to all users, the data network within the EOC tent will have the 
capability to perform quality of service and traffic shaping. This is to ensure that if users 
start to upload large volumes of data, such as video or audio clips, that those uploads can 
be throttled so that data from other users can still be transmitted in a timely manner.  
These policies will be created and enforced by the organization elected to manage 
the network. Since a complete end-to-end understanding of the deployed technology is 
valuable, it may be preferable that the organization placed in charge of the network be the 
same organization that has agreed to provide the mobile phones and mobile phone 
network. 
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VIII. APPLICATION SCENARIOS 
 The proposed system should be deployed in any disaster scenario where 
communications are degraded and a heterogeneous group of NGOs, government 
organizations, and other organizations respond. The number of situations where the 
system is needed within disaster areas is virtually limitless; from coordinating food 
distributions to requesting force protection to reporting locations that require proper body 
removal to disease outbreak reports, the system would be invaluable to all first 
responders. The latter application, disease tracking, was a capability that was especially 
needed by medical professionals in Haiti, and it was only partially solved many weeks 
into the disaster after Internet connections became more available and health workers 
were able to participate in online discussion groups (MMWR 2010, 1320–1324). 
 The system could be used as a type of universal information service, similar to the 
611 systems implemented in many American cities. First responders could send messages 
with general questions, such as, “Where can I find a medevac location,” or “Where is the 
nearest hospital with an x-ray machine?” Those questions can be answered either by their 
organization’s representative in the EOC tent, or the message could be forwarded to the 
appropriate person who has knowledge of an acceptable answer. 
 It is also conceivable that the system could be programmed to request data from 
field workers at regular intervals. Such functionality would be useful in gathering daily 
updates on medical facility capabilities, capacity, sickness and mortality rates, and other 
similar data points. A text could be sent to field hospitals every morning requesting that 
information and, once gathered, that same information could be posted to central 
information repositories, such as Sahana, and further distributed either via web or via the 
proposed system. 
Because the system itself could be deployed with a relatively small amount of 
hardware, the decision of when to deploy the network and phones need not necessarily be 
made before the responsible organization deploys to the disaster area. If for example, the 
World Food Program decided to be responsible for distributing phones and maintaining 
the mobile network, they could transport the system to the disaster area, perform a site 
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survey, and if conditions warrant, distribute phones and turn on the network. There is 
little downside to deploying the proposed network, provided users are transitioned off of 
the temporary network and onto a more permanent solution in an orderly fashion. 
Although the proposed system is designed to be used in international and 
domestic disaster response scenarios, there are a variety of other situations where the 
system could be of use. The system could be deployed in large Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDP) camps in order to facilitate communication between residents and relief 
workers, and to rapidly distribute camp announcements and information. It could also be 
linked to the worldwide telephone network so that residents could text with relatives and 
friends across the globe.  
It is also conceivable that the system could be commercialized and distributed to 
workers in a geographically concentrated area, such as large construction sites. The 
advantage being that subcontractors and workers would have to identify themselves when 
they turned on the phones, and therefore an easy-to-understand master list of contacts 
could be maintained by the general contractor. It would be relatively easy to contact those 
subcontractors thereafter via the master list. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
 The technology to improve communication, collaboration, and cooperation in 
disaster response already exists. This paper proposes fusing those technologies—low cost 
mobile phones, lightweight and rapidly deployable mobile phone network, and disaster 
response management software—along with an EOC tent and an organizational 
framework in which organizations can collaborate. Every one of the components in this 
system are reliable, procurable, and familiar to first responders. Aside from those items, 
all that is required is that first responder organizations have the desire and wherewithal to 
agree to implement it and communicate. 
 The system could be built collaboratively, with many different organizations 
contributing different parts of the system. For example, one organization could be in 
charge of setting up and running the EOC tent, another in charge of maintaining the 
disaster management software, another in charge of providing mobile phones. Such 
development could be created quickly in collaborative experimentation environments in 
both the physical and virtual worlds. 
 The system outlined above proposes a solution to two seemingly intractable 
problems: How to physically communicate within a disaster area, and how to increase 
cross-organization cooperation and collaboration. By implementing the proposed system, 
the disaster response community has an opportunity to potentially change for the better 
the way communications are handled in large scale disasters—and by doing so, 
potentially save countless lives. 
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